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q 201In this paper we present a reconceptualization of the social dimension of the human niche and the evolutionary
process that brought it into existence. We agree with many other evolutionary approaches that a key aspect of the
human niche is a social environment consisting primarily of cooperating and altruistic individuals, not a Hobbesian
social environment of “war of all against all.” However, in contrast to the conception of this social environment as
consisting of individuals who, in Boyd and Richerson’s words, “cooperate with large groups of unrelated indi-
viduals,” we propose that it is more accurately described as consisting of cooperating individuals who currently are
often nonkin but who, until relatively recently in human existence, were primarily, and in many cases almost
exclusively, kin. In contrast to the conception of this social environment coming into existence by way of a process
of selection within and between groups, we propose that it is the result of selection operating on traditions orig-
inated by ancestors and transmitted to their descendants. We use our ﬁeldwork in three areas of the world (New
Guinea, Ecuador, and Canada) to illustrate this process and how current social environments can be roughly placed
on a continuum from traditional to nontraditional.For more than 2,000 years our best thinkers have attempted to
unravel the “riddle,” as E. O.Wilson puts it (2013), posed by our
own behavior, namely, that although conﬂict appears difﬁcult
for humans to avoid (McCullough and Tabak 2010), coopera-
tion and altruism characterize much of the human social en-
vironment (see Nowak 2006).1 We view this social environment
characterized by cooperation and altruism as the result of social
niche construction. By “niche construction” we refer to the
process in which organisms transform aspects of their envi-
ronment and in the process change “the selection pressures to
which they and other organisms are exposed” (Laland, Odling-
Smee, and Feldman 2001:22; see also Rendell et al. 2010). We
use the phrase “human social niche” to refer to the behavior of
the other humans in the environment of an individual and with
whom that individual is likely to interact during his or her
lifetime.We ﬁnd this very basic and general conception of social
niche to be more appropriate for explanations of the evolution
of human cooperation than the far more speciﬁc use of “socialT. Palmer is Associate Professor in the Department of Anthro-
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aniche,” or “social niches,” to refer to “a series of overlapping,
hierarchical role-structures” within more recent and complex so-
cieties (Lipatov, Brown, and Feldman 2011:901; see also Brown
and Feldman 2009). We use the phrase “human social niche” in-
stead of “human social environment” to emphasize that through
social niche construction, organisms inﬂuence not only their
own social environment but also the social environment towhich
“their descendants are exposed” (Day, Laland, and Odling‐
Smee 2003:80; see also Fuentes,Wyczalkowski, andMacKinnon
2010) and thus inﬂuence the selective pressures operating on
those descendants. The use of the word “descendants” is im-
portant because it includes not just children and grandchildren
but a potentially unlimited number of subsequent generations
of descendants. To help solve the riddle of the relatively coop-
erative and altruistic social environment to which many gen-
erations of humans have been exposed, we present a new con-
ception of both the characteristics of the human social niche
and the evolutionary process that brought it into existence.
Reconceptualizing the Human Social Niche
We agree with other theorists that the social niche of our
ancestors was characterized by a large amount of coopera-
tion and altruism. However, in contrast to the conception of1. We will use the word “cooperation” to refer to individuals inﬂu-
encing each other’s behavior in ways that beneﬁt the ﬁtness of both
individuals and the word “altruism” to refer to acts that are costly to the
actor’s ﬁtness and beneﬁcial to the receiver’s ﬁtness (see West, El Mou-
den, and Gardner 2011).
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operate with large groups of unrelated individuals” (Boyd and
Richerson 1982:325, emphasis added), we propose that it is
more accurately described as consisting of cooperating and
altruistic individuals who now include many nonkin but until
relatively recently in human existence were primarily, and in
many cases almost exclusively, kin.2 By kin, we refer to in-
dividuals identiﬁed by others as being related by birth or from
common ancestors.3
We also agree with other approaches that the human social
niche can be described as both biological and cultural, but we
differ from many of those approaches by emphasizing the dis-
tinction between traditional cultural behavior (i.e., traditions)
and nontraditional cultural behavior. By “traditions” we refer
to behaviors descendants copy from their ancestors. Traditional
behaviors are a subset of cultural behaviors, which we deﬁne as
behaviors copied from any individual.4 These deﬁnitions allow
us to describe people’s behavior as relatively traditional when a2. We propose that the presence of “nonkin” in the residential com-
munities of contemporary foragers found by Hill et al. (2011) is the result of
individuals identiﬁed as very distant kin being classiﬁed as “nonkin” and
various aspects of contemporary environments (described below) thatmade
actual nonkin far more likely to be present than they would have been in the
past. Signiﬁcant sustained cooperation with nonkin may have occurred in
some places several thousand years ago but in other places as recently as the
current generation (see Diamond 1997:273, 2012).
3. “Fictive” or “metaphorical” kin are terms used to refer to indi-
viduals that are claimed to be actual kin in some circumstances but are
also acknowledged not to be actually related by birth (i.e., not actually
kin) in others. When individuals are identiﬁed as kin based on shared
descent, kinship terms may be used metaphorically to refer to genea-
logically distant kin but by using a kin term that literally refers to a
genealogically closer kin person (e.g., calling certain cousins siblings).
4. Culture may include information inside brains (Hill, Barton, and
Hurtado 2009), but it can only inﬂuence others and be copied if it is exhibited
as behavior. As behavior, both traditional and nontraditional cultural be-
haviors are biological in the sense of being an aspect of a living organism.
However, behaviors are not purely genetic or purely environmental because
all aspects of all living things are the result of genes interacting with many
environmental factors (Freeman 1983:294). More speciﬁcally, we propose
that people call a behavior cultural when one of the necessary elements in the
developmental environment of the individual performing the behavior was
another individual performing the behavior and serving as a model to be
imitated.We also propose that a behavior is called traditional to indicate that
the other person in the developmental environment serving as a model of
the behavior is a parent, grandparent, or more distant ancestor. Parts of
traditions may originate among nonkin or be signiﬁcantly modiﬁed during
transmission. Behaviors may even be invented and then falsely asserted to
have been transmitted from earlier generations of ancestors (Hobsbawmand
Ranger 1983). While acknowledging these possibilities, it is important to
recognize the evidence of actual traditional transmission of behaviors
(Mathews and Perreault 2015) and to realize that there would be no point in
falsely claiming that a behavior is traditional if the actual multigenerational
transmission of behaviors was not seen as being important. What is needed
is a theory that can account for not only the breaking, manipulating, re-
jecting, and inventing of traditions but also for the existence of traditions
(Palmer 2010, 2013).
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(i.e., copied from ancestors) and relatively nontraditional when
a relatively large amount of their cultural behavior is nontra-
ditional (i.e., copied from individuals other than ancestors).5We
further propose that social environments in which much of the
behavior is traditional probably correspond to the ancestral
human social niche designed by selection more closely than do
social environments where most behavior is not traditional.
This is consistent with the observation by Cronk (1999) that the
human niche, what he refers to as “the world we weremade for,”
includes the replication of behaviors with relatively little change
and the preponderance of kin in the social environment: “we
were made for a world that has mostly disappeared . . . a world
in which all activities were enmeshed in webs of kinship . . . a
world in which things rarely changed much over the course of a
lifetime” (119).
This focus on kinship and traditions is in contrast to de-
scriptions of social relationships relying on the concept of
“groups.” Indeed, much of the novelty of our proposal comes
from the absence of the term “group,” which we avoid for three
reasons. First, “group” often refers to a reiﬁed abstraction (Mur-
dock 1971). Humans obviously come into close proximity with
each other and interact in various ways, but when described as
groups, these interactions between individuals are often en-
dowed with properties they do not possess, such as being an
animate entity that can do things such as survive, reproduce, and
evolve (as opposed to merely “change”).
The second reason we avoid the term is that groups are
often presented as preexisting givens that can be used as var-
iables in evolutionary equations to explain the evolution of
cooperation. For example, Traulsen and Nowak (2006:10952)
start their explanation with the assumptions that “a popula-
tion is subdivided into groups,” and “if a group reaches a
certain size, it can split into two.”6 This assumed preexistence
of groups with certain characteristics is also found in the
many different models of cultural group selection, including
those emphasizing conformity and prestige-based biases (see
Boyd and Richerson 2010; Henrich 2004; Soltis, Boyd, and
Richerson 1995).7 Preexisting groups are also used as variables
in approaches that use the Price equation to conceptualize kin
selection, reciprocal altruism, and group selection as “simply5. We do not consider the term “traditional” to be either derogatory
or complimentary.
6. Boyd, Richerson and Henrich (2011) make a similar assumption:
“The population is structured into a large number of groups. Local
population regulation maintains groups at a ﬁxed, ﬁnite size and during
each generation groups exchange migrants with all other groups” (433).
Similarly, Hill, Burton, and Hurtado (2009) refer to theoretical mod-
eling showing that “copying is most favored in groups that already have
many copiers who have already produced adaptive culture” (190).
7. As Richerson and Boyd (2010:3788) point out, “group selection
has many faces.” For a discussion of the many different meanings of
both group selection and cultural group selection, see West, El Mouden,
and Gardner (2011).
73.193 on December 02, 2016 08:38:29 AM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Palmer, Coe, and Steadman Reconceptualizing the Human Social Niche S183three systems of gene-tracking and ﬁtness accounting from
three different perspectives” (Bijma and Wade 2008; Ham-
ilton 1975; Henrich 2004:10; Hill, Barton, and Hurtado 2009;
Price 1972; Wade et al. 2010; Wilson 2015). In contrast, we pro-
pose that the interactions ofmultiple humans in close proximity
should be conceived of not as givens but as what needs to be
explained. We agree with Boyd, Richerson, and Henrich (2011)
that “we owe our success to our uniquely developed ability to
learn from others” (10918). However, we disagree that the con-
struction of our human social niche, what they refer to as our
“cultural adaptation,” is best seen as “a population process”
(Boyd, Richerson, and Henrich 2011:10921). Instead, we try to
specify from whom they were learning and who they were
copying—kin.
The third reason we avoid the word “group” is that it is often
used to refer to any category of humans, including categories
where many members may never interact or be gathered to-
gether in close proximity (e.g., tribes, clans, phratries, sibs, peo-
ples, cultures, ethnic groups, nations; Palmer, Fredrickson, and
Tilley 1997; see also Godfrey-Smith 2006).
These three reasons for avoiding the word “group” are im-
portant because of the role the term “group” plays in both
descriptions of the human social niche as consisting of coop-
eration within and between groups and in the hypothesized
construction of this niche by a process of selection within and
between groups. Fortunately, not only can the characteristics of
the human social niche be accurately described without the use
of the term “group” but also the process by which it was
constructed can be described.9. The concept of traditions being subject to natural selection is
consistent with Darwin’s ability, before the discovery of genes, to realizeReconceptualizing How the Human Social
Niche Came to Exist
Our explanation of the construction of the human social niche
attempts to answer the question, how did our ancestors manage
to construct a social environment in which their descendants
would live that was populated by many, primarily cooperative,
and even altruistic individuals instead of by hostile competi-
tors?8 Our answer is that they started traditions that inﬂuenced
their offspring to both cooperate with and exhibit altruism
toward their siblings and inﬂuenced those offspring to replicate
that behavior in order to inﬂuence their own offspring to co-
operate with and exhibit altruism toward all of the ancestor’s
grandchildren (i.e., their siblings and their ﬁrst cousins), and
so on and so forth throughout subsequent generations (Palmer
and Palmer 2015). Speciﬁcally, we propose that the human so-
cial niche is the result of selection operating on traditions orig-
inated by ancestors and transmitted, along with their genes, to
their descendants and inﬂuencing those descendants to coop-8. These ancestors were perhaps living in the type of simple social
organization that limited the identiﬁcation of kin to only two or three
generations, as described by Chapais (2008).
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ﬁed as such by traditional names and “ethnic markers.”9
Our explanation of how selection could have favored the
transmission of these traditions starts with an explanation of
altruism ﬁrst put forth in the mid-1970s. The parental ma-
nipulation explanation of altruism (Alexander 1974; Dawkins
1982; West-Eberhard 1975) is based on the concept of parent-
offspring conﬂict. As originally stated by Trivers (1974), the
existence of parent-offspring conﬂict means that “parents are
expected to attempt to mold an offspring, against its better
interests” and in favor of the interests of the parent (249). This
attempted molding, or manipulation, is the result of the simple
biological fact that a parent is equally related to all of his or her
offspring, but the offspring is completely related to itself (rp 1)
and only half related to a full sibling (r p 0.5). Therefore,
evolutionary theory predicts that an “offspring should value its
personal ﬁtness twice as much as it values any full sib’s ﬁtness”
(Kurland and Gaulin 2005:452), but parents should try to in-
ﬂuence offspring to value a full sibling as much as it values it-
self (Wright 1994:166) because both siblings are equally valu-
able to the parent in terms of genetic relatedness because both
are equally related to the parent.
The parental manipulation explanation is likely to be in-
volved in the construction of the human social niche because
“humans are parental manipulators par excellence” (Alex-
ander 1974:367), and a human parent can suppress selﬁsh
behavior even in their adult offspring and even after the
death of the parent (Alexander 1974:368; Trivers 1974:262).
Voland and Voland (1995) come close to recognizing the
consequences of parental manipulation when they refer to
the possibility of offspring being “raised to ‘voluntarily’ stake
at least part of their reproductive ﬁtness for the maintenance
and welfare of their families and thus to the long term ad-
vantage of their lineage” (407, emphasis added). The use of
the word “lineage” is crucial because it refers to a chain of
ancestors and descendants and therefore implies a time span
much longer than one individual’s life span. The failure to
follow up on this insight is unfortunate, because recognizing
that this manipulation can be extended past a single gener-
ation leads to a profound new prediction about the behavior
of distant generations of descendants.
If individuals who inﬂuenced all of their offspring to “treat
each other as if you valued them as much as yourself ” (i.e.,
r p 1.0) have been favored by natural selection over indi-
viduals who did not inﬂuence their offspring to behave this
way toward their siblings, then individuals who inﬂuenced
all of their grandchildren to “treat each other as if you valuedthe power of natural selection by observing phenotypic traits trans-
mitted from parent to offspring. These traditions, or “ethnic markers,”
are “one of the most striking and unusual features of the human species”
(Boyd and Richerson 2006:104, 1982). However, this is not because they
form ethnic “groups” but because they identify codescendants.
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favored over individuals who did not inﬂuence their grand-
children to behave this way toward their siblings and ﬁrst
cousins. Further, individuals who inﬂuenced all of their great-
grandchildren to “treat each other as if you valued them as
much as yourself” (i.e., rp 1.0) would have been favored over
individuals who did not inﬂuence their great-grandchildren to
behave this way toward their siblings, ﬁrst cousins, second
cousins, and so on and so forth. This leads to the conclusion
that selection would have favored individuals who were most
successful at inﬂuencing the social behavior among the most
distant generation of their descendants (Coe et al. 2010; Stead-
man and Palmer 2008).
The next question is what process could enable individual
humans to have such inﬂuence on the behavior of their de-
scendants born many generations after their own death? We
propose that the answer is as simple as it has been unappreci-
ated: by transmitting traditional behaviors that inﬂuenced each
generation to be willing to behave in those ways and then to go
on to replicate that inﬂuence on the next generation.
This multigenerational approach is fully compatible with
the view that natural selection can be better measured over a
large number of generations than in terms of the number of
surviving children or grandchildren produced (Alexander
1974:346, 374; Dawkins 1982:184). It is also consistent with
the evidence of cultural traditions often enduring many
generations (Coe 2003; Mathews and Perreault 2015; Palmer
2010; Palmer and Steadman 1997) as well as the fact that “large
lineages or clans . . . grow up over time as the descendants of
the original ancestor/ancestress” accumulate (Fox 1967:122).
It is also consistent with the observation that “kinship pred-
icates the axiom of amity, the prescriptive altruism exhibited
in the ethic of generosity,” and that this “axiom” of “kinship
amity” is apparently a cultural universal (Fortes 1949:231–
232). Finally, it is also consistent with examples where explicit
emphasis is placed on replicating the traditional code of ethics
to the next generation (e.g., the Jewish prayer known as the
V’ahavta; see Sosis 2008:214). We emphasize, however, that
this process, which can lead to the axiom of kinship amity
applying to tens of thousands of individuals because they are
identiﬁed as kin (Keesing 1975), only occurs when traditions
identifying kin are transmitted over many generations. This is
important because it is difﬁcult to see how large numbers of
individuals can come to identify each other as kin without the
transmission of traditions over many generations regardless
of the selection taking place between and within groups.1010. One of the few alternative ways such a social environment could
be constructed is the ﬁctitious one described by Kurt Vonnegut (1976)
in his tongue-in-cheek novel Slapstick; or, Lonesome No More! As Cronk
(1999:129) explains, Vonnegut’s character Dr. Swain runs for president
on the promise to use “the computers of the federal government to
recreate kinship networks like those of our ancestors . . . [including]
190,000 cousins, all obligated to help fellow clan members.” Although
explicitly a fantasy, it highlights the challenge that evolutionary theories
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unrecognized, so too has the difﬁculty and uncertainty of
transmitting traditions. Evolutionary explanations of culture
tend to see only cultural change as an active process involv-
ing such activities as “the hard work of invention” (Schiffer
2005:485), the operation of various cultural transmission
biases (e.g., Henrich 2004), and random copying errors (e.g.,
Eerkens and Lipo 2005; Richerson and Boyd 2010). Over-
looked is the fact that the preservation of traditional behaviors
is also an active process that requires hard work (Coe and
Palmer 2013; Palmer 2010).11
To illustrate the process just described and how it has re-
sulted in current social environments forming a continuum
from traditional to nontraditional, we use examples from three
distinct areas where we have performed extensive ﬁeldwork
(New Guinea, Ecuador, and Canada).
The Hewa
The Hewa are a people living in the western highland of Papua
New Guinea who, Steadman (1971) writes, had small gardens
and were excellent hunters. They were one of the last people in
Papua NewGuinea to come into contact with outsiders; in fact,
they had very recently been discovered by an Australian Patrol
ofﬁcer. Several thousand individuals were called “Hewa,” and
most of them lived in the large area bisected by the Lagaip River
and its tributaries. Beginning in 1966, Steadman initiated his
2-year study of approximately 500 Hewa living on the western
side of this area. While they wore similar traditional attire and
sharedmany other traditions, they had no name for themselves.
“Hewa” was the name given to them by nonkin living in the
surrounding areas.
The habitat was characterized by dense rain forest, sharp
mountain ridges, and swift rivers. Consequently, “the Hewa”
were not only geographically isolated in the sense of having
relatively little contact with outsiders—nonkin—but each fam-
ily lived in relative isolation from other families. As Steadman’s
knowledge of these people, their language, and their culture
increased, he realized “theHewa”were not a social group.While
their language belonged to the Sepik Hill family, the way they
spoke gradually changed as one crossed the area to the point that
people living on one side of “the Hewa” would have a hard time
communicating with those on the other side. Further, there was
no overarching hierarchy; the largest hierarchies were tempo-11. Because of the social behavior resulting from the traditional social
inﬂuence of parents and not the sharing of genes, changes in social in-
ﬂuence could lead to cooperation with, and altruism toward, individuals
not identiﬁed as kin. This is what allowed for the human social envi-
ronment to be relatively recently modiﬁed from one populated almost
exclusively by individuals identiﬁed as kin to one consisting of individuals
who “cooperate with large groups of unrelated individuals.”
focused on selection between and within groups, and ignoring traditions,
face in accounting for one of the most basic aspects of the human social
environment.
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or seven households.
Steadman also came to realize that the relationships
among these people were based on descent from common
ancestors. Cooperation and altruism occurred only between
individuals identiﬁed as kin; whenever Steadman asked why
an instance of altruism or cooperation occurred, the reason
given was always kinship, which as Steadman also quickly
learned was not a group phenomenon.
Like most people in the world, the Hewa used two naming
systems to identify their kin: kin terms to identify close kin and
ancestral names (such as clan or “family” names) to identify
more distant kin. In regard to those kin identiﬁed by kin terms,
every individual was at the center or his or her own unique set of
kinsmen (i.e., his or her kindred). Also, the Hewa, like many
other people, extended kin terms metaphorically to all their
identiﬁed kin, close and far. Certain cousins, for example, were
referred to as “siblings.” This metaphorical extension, however,
never violated a crucial kinship rule, that genealogically closer
kin were favored over more distant kin.12
In regard to ancestral names (i.e., clan names), all indi-
viduals bearing one’s own clan name were always considered
kin because the name identiﬁed them as codescendants—the
only way to obtain a clan name was by descent from someone
with that clan name. The individuals identiﬁed as kin by clan
names included all those bearing the clan names of any of
one’s four grandparents and the clan names of some great-
grandparents and their offspring. And, of course, the children
of any kinsmen were your kinsmen, as were the grand-
children, and so forth. Thus, by using clan names these people
could identify many distant relatives. It is important to note
that the residences of individuals with the same clan name
were scattered in a wide variety of residential areas. Clans—
comprising those individuals sharing the same ancestral name—
were exogamous; one could not marry an individual bearing
one’s own clan name. Thus, every household contained indi-
viduals of different clans.
The enduring cooperation and altruism between many
individuals in the social niche constructed by the ancestors of
these people did not arise as merely the result of shared genes.
It was encouraged through traditional behaviors, many of
which could be described as forms of ancestor worship, en-
couraging descendants to accept the inﬂuence of their an-
cestors, including the ancestors’ encouragement of coopera-
tion with and altruism toward kin. One such tradition was the
hanging of skulls of dead ancestors inside their houses, where
they would be treated with great respect. People would also
punish those who behaved in ways that violated the tradi-
tional taboos passed down to them from their ancestors, and12. The existence of killing among the Hewa demonstrates how
traditions do not eliminate conﬂict among kin. However, just as a Hewa
would favor his closer kin in hunting and in exchanging food, a Hewa
would also favor closer kin in a ﬁght.
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ancestors to make up for failing to accept their inﬂuence.
Many of the traditional forms of social cooperation and
altruism were transmitted by observation, as were the many
other traditional behaviors involved in such tasks as sub-
sistence activities and house making. Proper social behavior
was also often transmitted from one generation to the next
during the evenings when people would praise the behaviors
of some individuals and criticize those of others, often jus-
tifying these judgments by referencing traditional stories.
Although the Hewa had remained relatively isolated, and
relatively traditional, when Steadman returned 15 years later, he
found certain instances of increased contact between the people
referred to as Hewa and nonkin. Kinship was still the basis of all
cooperation, but it now became important in new ways, in-
cluding trade. For example, Steadman found out that Tama, son
of a man who had been an informant, had, at the encourage-
ment of the Australian government, agreed to work on a distant
tea plantation for 2 years, where he learned to speak pidgin
English. Tama’s patrilineal clan name came from a distant male
ancestor who, many generations ago, had crossed the moun-
tains into the Hewa area from an area known as Kopiago (or
Duna) and left male descendants, including Tama. The people
called Kopiago had very different traditions from those called
Hewa, including a completely different language. After Tama
landed at Kopiago Airstrip and before he began the long trek
back to his home, he decided to visit his alleged distant clansmen
among the people referred to as Kopiago. After introducing him-
self, using his newly acquired pidgin English, he explained to
them that even though he lived among people most outsiders
called “Hewa,” he was a descendant of their clan ancestor. They
welcomed him and he stayed with them for several weeks, re-
turning with gifts for their kin.
Another example concerned Wato, another Hewa man also
returned from working at a tea plantation where he learned
pidgin English. Wato decided to cross the wide Strickland River
to trade with people called the Oksapmin. He assumed that
because he could speak the lingua franca of New Guinea that he
could get along with anybody who could speak that language.
However, although he could communicate with some Oksap-
min in pidgin English, he could not show any kinship linkages
with them. They killed him. These examples illustrate the im-
portance of kinship, even distant kinship, and the extreme
danger of attempting to cooperate with anyone but kin.
The Chachi
The people referred to as “the Chachi” (formerly called the
“Cayapa”) live in Ecuador’s lowland coastal rainforest. Data
on these people were collected over a 90-year period, begin-
ning in 1907, by Barrett (1925), then continued by Altschuler
(1964), who was there in the early 1960s, and then Coe (1995),
who conducted her primary ﬁeldwork in 1989–1990.
In 1989, seven thousand individuals referred to as the Chachi
lived, as their ancestors had since prehistoric times, in isolated73.193 on December 02, 2016 08:38:29 AM
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isolated section of northwestern Ecuador’s Santiago Drainage,13
an area characterized by intermittent contact with the outside
and accessible only by dugout canoe.14 Out of the several hun-
dred categories of codescendants identiﬁed by descent from
common ancestors that resided in the coastal rainforest of
Ecuador in prehistoric times, the Chachi are one of only two
whose descendants survive today. While maintaining many
traditions, their behavior, in 1989–1990, was less traditional
than the behavior of the people studied by Steadman because
they were starting to experience the disappearance of many
traditions because of contact with outsiders.15 The Chachi’s
claim that they share a common ancestor is supported by ge-
netic evidence indicating that they actually do come from a
small founding population with only occasional entry of genes
from other individuals who came in as wives.16
Chachi, who have always claimed that their system of be-
havioral codes was ancient, when asked where their system of
behavioral codes had come from inevitably replied, “That is the
way the ancestors did things and that is the way they want us to
do them” (Coe 1995). While they linked current practices to13. The small number of Chachi who live in Muisne separated from
the others because they wanted to change the behavioral codes so they
could marry polygynously.
14. Access to the area has been difﬁcult; however, some gold has
been found in the rivers, and the area has been rich in endemic plant
life, including tagua (important at one time for making buttons), balsa
(important during World War II), and bananas (important after blight
destroyed the crop in other areas). While efforts to harvest these re-
sources were initiated, none of the efforts were sustained. An African
Ecuadorian population was also brought in at one time to pan for gold,
a venture that soon failed. The extent to which these outside inﬂuences
and missionaries changed certain speciﬁc practices (e.g., monogamy) is
unclear (see Praet 2009:2, 10).
15. This contact was accompanied by the loss of land to lumber
concessions and the introduction of diseases. The Chachi, as described by
Barrett (1925), had good health. He wrote that the area in which they lived
was “the most salubrious territory of the entire western coast of South
America” (Barrett 1925:25). He observed no serious contagious diseases;
typhoid was entirely unknown, dysentery was little known, and cases of
malaria were mild. The most frequent causes of death were drowning,
falling from trees, and being bitten by snakes. By 1989–1990, this situa-
tion had changed considerably; dysentery was widespread, and infant and
maternal mortality were reported to be high. Additional causes of mor-
bidity and mortality included malaria, anemia, malnutrition, chronic di-
arrheas, intestinal parasites, malabsorption, leishmaniosis, scabies, yellow
fever, tuberculosis, bronchitis, and pneumonia. The ﬁrst case of oncho-
cerciasis was discovered in the area in 1980. According to data provided at
that time by Ron Guderian, MD, 71.8% of the Chachi living on the Rio
San Miguel tested positive for the disease in the late 1980s.
16. Genetic studies of HLA-B variants and mtDNA (C10 haplotype)
support that the Chachi actually do share a common ancestor, that the
genetic diversity of the founding population was limited, and that the
Chachi have maintained relative isolation for a long period of time in
situ (Garber et al. 1991; Rickards et al. 1999).
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argues that the Chachi have no ancestors, claiming that they,
“like many Amazonian and Andean groups explicitly refuse to
remember anything about the dead. The dead are relentlessly
annihilated and systematically erased from livingmembers.”On
the same page, however, he writes that the Chachi claim they
live in “ancestral” territory, a claim, based on their traditional
stories, that they used successfully in 1992 when they sought
formal recognition of their land rights. Praet also contradicts his
claim when he writes that the “living are not always neatly set
apart from the dead,” when he describes funerals as sacred
rituals that involve playing games with the deceased, now an
ancestor, and leaving food for themby their graves, andwhen he
calls the ceremonial center where all kinship and traditional
events are held “the village of the dead” (Praet 2005:136).
Although most Chachi lived in the Santiago Basin, “mem-
bership,” or acceptance as a Chachi, was determined by birth.
As Altschuler (1967:32) explained, membership “is limited
to born Cayapa.” Chachi, as Coe described, were identiﬁed
by birth to a Chachi mother (a woman who had a Chachi
mother). Fathers were identiﬁed through their close and prior
relationship with the mother. If the father was not identiﬁed
as Chachi, a rare event, the child would be considered to be
Chachi, but illegitimate. On rare occasions (rare, given strong
rules of endogamy), a Chachi was identiﬁed by birth to a non-
Chachi female who had a close, intimate relationship with a
Chachi male.17 All Chachi were considered to be kin based on
descent from clan ancestors identiﬁed by patrilineal names;
they saw outsiders—those with different ancestors—as not
being true people. Although they were encouraged to behave
in cooperative ways with all Chachi, they favored genealogi-
cally closer kin (e.g., those sharing two parents, one parent,
grandparents) over more distant ones. Distant kin were iden-
tiﬁed as those sharing a ceremonial site (and a patrilineally in-
herited last name) as they shared a distant Chachi ancestor. A
Chachi male or female was identiﬁable through a set of tra-
ditions described in detail by both Barrett and Coe and that
included not only the ability to speak a unique language (Cha-
paalachi) but various forms of art (e.g., body decoration, paint-
ings on dugout canoes, designs in weaving) that the Chachi
claimed they had inherited from their ancestors.18 Participation17. The children born to non-Chachi mothers but who had Chachi
fathers were treated as social outcasts. When Coe asked the Chachi why
endogamy was so important to them, they explained, “If our children do
not marry Chachi we will be gone as a people in one generation.”
18. These resembled those found in the Andes, where the Chachi
claimed their distant ancestors had once lived and with whom even their
more recent ancestors had maintained kinship ties. These art motifs also
closely resembled those made by the Tsachila and Awa, people who
lived in other areas of the rainforests in northern Ecuador and southern
Colombia but who claimed descent from the same distant ancestors. It
seems clear that the art of the Chachi, Tsachila, and Awa was inherited
from a distant ancestor they all shared.
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stories and activities that were part of the ceremonies, promoted
or encouraged cooperation with other Chachi. These stories
related how the ancestors wanted their descendants to continue
practicing the same ceremonies and described how they wanted
their descendants to behave—in other words, stories were used
to teach appropriate social behavior.
Neither Barrett (1925) nor Altschuler (1964) described how
these cultural traits were transmitted across generations, al-
though transmission obviously was occurring. Chachi children,
based on data collection using both continuous and scan sam-
pling, were instructed beginning early in life about the moral
system and the duties they would need to perform later as par-
ents and spouses. Through copying and guided practice, Chachi
children learned complex technologies (e.g., girls learned weav-
ing, boys learned how to make a dugout canoe). In the process,
they also learned the history of their people and how to prop-
erly interact with kin.
Relationships within the family, Barrett (1925:42) writes,
were held sacred, and family ties were binding; “one of themost
characteristic features of the daily life of the Cayapa is the de-
votion of the members of the family toward one another.”
Further, Altschuler (1964:57) explains that “it is expected that
siblings will form an especially intense bond.” Chachi children,
Altschuler (1967) writes, were taught to respect their parents,
grandparents, other Chachi elders, and their ancestors. He de-
scribes how children treated their grandparents with respect,
referring to them as mother and father. The children also were
to attend and respectfully participate in the ceremonies, in-
cluding those honoring the deceased.
In sum, kinship was the organizing principle among these
people, with kinship deﬁned broadly as based on birth and
shared descent and as identiﬁed by kin terms and ancestral
names and other traditions. The myths and stories used in
ceremonies were traditional and often were accounts of how
Chachi ancestors had behaved and wanted their descendants
to behave. These stories formed the core of the system of
behavioral codes that, as a result of being passed down for
many generations, had constructed the Chachi version of the
human social niche.
Newfoundlanders
The behavior of the people in Canada referred to as
“Newfoundlanders” is much less traditional than that found
in the two earlier examples.19 That is, less of the behavior of
these people has been copied from ancestors, and much of19. “Newfoundland” is used here to refer to the island part of the
province of Newfoundland and Labrador. Because of the negative
connotations sometimes associated with the word “Newﬁe,” the term
“Newfoundlander” will be used except where “Newﬁe” appears as part
of a quotation.
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been passed down for as many generations as in the earlier
examples. Further, the name of this category of people refers
not to a common ancestor but to the geographic area to
which most of the ancestors of the current population mi-
grated from Europe, especially England and Ireland, over the
last few centuries (Mannion 1977).20 However, although the
term “Newfoundlander” started as a name referring to a res-
ident of a certain geographic area, it subsequently came to
identify the descendants of those individuals. In a process that
has occurred at many times and in many places in the last
several thousand years, the name of a location started to be
transmitted, along with many accompanying behaviors, from
parents to offspring (i.e., it became traditional). As this hap-
pened, the traditions accompanying the name “Newfound-
lander” started the same process seen in the other two examples.
More recently, as in the previous examples, the inﬂuence of
these traditions started to lessen.
The following description of Newfoundland traditions
starts with Firestone’s (1967) description of life along the west
coast of the northern peninsula of Newfoundland known as
“the Straits” during 1962 and 1963. Although traditional
compared with many areas of North America at this time, Fire-
stone describes the deterioration of traditions passed down
from earlier generations.
Firestone emphasizes that the people he studied did not form
a social group but instead an environment where there was
“a series of limitations to the social world” (Firestone 1967:33).
At the core of this social world was a form of kinship cooper-
ation and altruism traditionally encouraged by ancestors: “when
brothers grow up they are expected to ﬁsh with each other and
their father” (Firestone 1967:47). Thus, in the next generation
“The essential nexus of co-operation is still brothers . . . [who]
carry on together after their father has died, . . . [and with their
sons] make up the nexuses of future crews” (Firestone 1967:66).
Firestone also emphasizes that this pattern results from the
traditional moral code stating that “Brothers and their father
remaining together and ‘all hauling together’ is the ideal” (Fire-
stone 1967:51). In an example of how the transmission of
traditions to new generations can expand the number of co-
operating codescendants, Firestone writes, “where cousins co-
operate within a single crew, we have a family extending over
four generations and including the founder, his sons, grand-
sons, and their immature off-spring” (Firestone 1967:51).
Firestone (1967) also describes how “if men split up before
their boys are grown ‘people talk about it’ ” (52). Despite
criticism of those who fail to follow traditional patterns, the20. Some of the genes, traditions, and traditional material culture of
the area (e.g., a traditional Inuit sled known as a qamotiq) have come
from indigenous populations in the area (e.g., Inuit, Innu, Mik’maq).
The primary indigenous population on Newfoundland was known as
the Beothuk, the last of whom died in the early nineteenth century.
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the extent of cooperation among codescendants: “Instances
where ﬁrst cousins do ﬁsh together [were] . . . more prevalent
in the past” (Firestone 1967:51). More recently, “After the
father dies the oldest brother becomes the leader. . . .When the
brothers’ children grow up there will in most cases be a split
and each brother will ﬁsh with his sons” (Firestone 1967:47).
Palmer’s ﬁeldwork began 25 years later and continued
through the following generation among both descendants
still living in Newfoundland and those who had migrated to
Alberta to work in the oil industry.21 Palmer found evidence
that many traditions in the Straits were fading.22 This includes
even the patrilocality that had produced the “essential nexus
of co-operation” between male codescendants.23
The recent migration of many Newfoundlanders to Alberta
not only reveals the inaccuracy of referring to this category as
a group, it also reveals the extent to which the identity of
“Newfoundlander” is now based on ancestry more than geo-
graphic location. Further, even the social behavior involved
in this migration is still signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by traditions
encouraging cooperation with and altruism toward kin. Kin
provide crucial help with every aspect of the migration, in-
cluding transportation, housing, employment, and childcare
(Palmer, Groom, and Brandon 2012). While some of this in-
teraction (e.g., residential clustering) might be described as a
group (Wilson 2002), a closer examination of the interaction
between Newfoundlanders in Alberta quickly reveals the in-
accuracy of such a description. For example, the number of
cooperating Newfoundlanders identiﬁed by descent names as
cousins in Alberta can be extremely large (over 200 in one case
described by Palmer, Groom, and Brandon 2012), despite all
of these cousins never being gathered together.
The ability of descent names to allow individuals to
identify even distant codescendants as kin the ﬁrst time they21. Palmer’s initial ﬁeldwork from 1990 to 1992 was followed by eight
subsequent periods of ﬁeldwork between 1994 and 2011 in Newfound-
land and four periods of ﬁeldwork during the same time period in
communities in Alberta where many Newfoundlanders had moved fol-
lowing the collapse of the cod ﬁshery in the early 1990s (Palmer and
Sinclair 1997; Palmer, Groom, and Brandon 2012).Most of thismigration
was related to employment opportunities associated with the oil industry.
Although this migration may hasten the end of many traditions, it also
revealed the extent to which the Newfoundland identity was based on
descent, not current residence, and led to cooperation and altruism with
those sharing that descent.
22. Palmer and Sinclair (2000:42) found wide variation in the
percentages of male and female high school students who had partici-
pated in a wide range of traditional activities, ranging from 97.9% females
and 93.4% males who had participated in picking berries to 1.4% females
and 4.6% males who had participated in making sealskin boots.
23. Not only was the traditional male-only inheritance of land be-
coming actively debated (Palmer 1995), women were becoming more
likely than men to expect to inherit part of their parent’s land (Palmer
and Sinclair 2000:39).
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living in Alberta: “I stopped in the ofﬁce, talked to this other
lady that’s there. . . . Turns out, her family are . . . [same
family name as my maiden name]. So we’re related ﬁve or
so generations back.” The ability to use descent names to
identify individuals as kin even when they have a different
descent name was illustrated at a party in Fort McMurray
where a handful of Newfoundlanders who had never previ-
ously met were able to identify each other as kin through the
tracing of birth links through female relatives back to indi-
viduals with the same descent name.
Visual displays signaling that one is a Newfoundlander (i.e.,
ethnic markers) play an important role in Newfoundland-to-
Alberta migration because such displays can signiﬁcantly alter
the social environment. The transmission of the Newfound-
land identity to children born in Alberta from Newfoundland
parents is indicated by T-shirts saying “Made in Alberta, with
parts fromNewfoundland” (Palmer, Groom, andBrandon 2012).
Such displays of Newfoundland identity often lead to cooper-
ation and altruism (Hiller 2009). For example, a Newfoundland
ﬂag hanging off an apartment balcony in Fort McMurray is
sometimes taken as an invitation to otherNewfoundlanders that
they could come in and have a place to stay (Palmer, Groom,
and Brandon 2012). Newfoundland identity and social behavior
are transmitted largely through the telling of stories about kin-
ship cooperation back home in Newfoundland.Discussion
Hewa, Chachi, and Newfoundlanders all exist in an envi-
ronment populated with many individuals who are generally
cooperative and altruistic. In all of these examples, this social
environment has been at least partially constructed by tra-
ditions identifying individuals as kin and inﬂuencing coop-
erative and altruistic behavior toward individuals because
they are identiﬁed as kin. These three examples also illustrate
how social environments have been changing. This change
has been taking place at vastly different rates in different
places, but in general, as the inﬂuence of traditions diminish,
the social environment becomes populated less by altruistic
and cooperative kin and more by nonkin. On the continuum
between the highly traditional social environments of our
ancestors thousands of years ago and the nontraditional ones
of today, the Hewa, and to a somewhat lesser extent the
Chachi, fall close to the traditional end of the spectrum,
while Newfoundlanders fall near the nontraditional end.
In this paper we raise three important points. First, the
construction of the human social niche can be described
without using the concept of “a group,” much less a model
based on selection within and between groups. Second,
models based on selection within and between groups are
unable to account for the large categories of codescendants
identiﬁed by traditions (e.g., clan names) and the coopera-
tion and altruism exhibited toward codescendants. Third,73.193 on December 02, 2016 08:38:29 AM
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from unique in the ethnographic record.24
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the ancestral ghosts” (Sumner 1907:232). Or, as the Lugbara of Africa state
concisely, “the rules of social behaviour are the ‘words of our ancestors’ ”
(Middleton 1960:27). Further, who is or is not subject to those traditional
behavioral codes, as Edel and Edel (1959:16) explain, is typically deter-
mined by kinship: “Kin are those who count in its reckoning and take part
in its proceedings.” Membership, Briffault (1931:57) writes, was based on
kinship; for members there are rules of “kindness, love, help, and peace
applicable to members of our own clan, tribe, or community, the other of
robbery, hatred, enmity, andmurder to all the rest of the world.”This “tie of
blood to forefathers” led to the claim that membership was determined by
kinship and descent, not geography (King 1972:37). Similarly, Confucius
(Rainey 2010:36, 38) points out, marriage and ﬁlial piety are keys to un-
derstanding extended kin groups. This “ancestral law” or “proper way”
(Keen 2004:244) emphasizes the “rules and conventions about how people
in certain relations ought to behave towards one another.” It involves the
transmission of an “ethic of generosity” (Hiatt 1982:23) alongside other
traditional formsmaking an obligation of self-restraint: “The obligations of
kinship govern a person’s behaviour from his earliest years to his death, and
affect life in all its aspects; in conversation, visiting and camping; at the
crises of life, namely, childbirth, initiation, marriage, sickness and death;
and in quarrels and ﬁghts” (Elkin 1964:118). Among the Ndembu, the
moral person is one “who bears no grudges, who is without jealousy, envy,
pride, anger, covetousness, lust, greed, etc., and who honours his kinship
obligations . . . [and] respects and remembers his ancestors” (Turner
1975:48–49). Turner (1975) also notes that this “ethical code” is universal
and would be recognized as valid by all human groups. Fortes (1949) de-
scribed the axiom of amity as behavior inﬂuenced bymoral rules specifying
generosity, trust, and altruism and which cluster around the sphere of
kinship deﬁned not only as relationships within the family but those created
more broadly through lineage relationships. As Tylor (1898:250) notes,
nothing displeased the ancestors more than “changing the old customs they
were used to” and a “lack of respect for the aged.” Traditions are seen as
wisdom coming from the past (Holkup et al. 2007). Rules honoring the
elders, ancestors, and traditions, Diamond writes (1951), are found in all
traditional societies. Ancestor worship may be a human universal (Stead-
man, Palmer, and Tilley 1996), and according to Tylor (1898), “the worship
of the dead encourages good morals.”
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